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NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH? TRANSITIONAL
REGIMES CONFRONT THE PAST
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 (forth-
coming).
Reviewed by Joan Fitzpatrick*
Nowhere is the divide between law and politics more painfully
apparent to human rights scholars than when newly democratic societies
confront gross human rights violations committed by previous authori-
tarian regimes. The legal rules can be stated simply - crimes against
humanity should be prosecuted and every victim of a fundamental
human rights violation is entitled to an adequate remedy.' In the transi-
tion following the total defeat of a rights-abusing regime, criminal
punishment may be swift and extensive. Where human rights violations
are aberrant abuses of power within a society otherwise committed to
the rule of law, domestic remedies will typically be available to the
victims.
Neither of these scenarios applies to the wide array of states profiled
by Naomi Roht-Arriaza and her co-authors in Impunity and Human
Rights in International Law and Practice. The challenge of optimizing
redress for past horrors is not confined to the Southern Cone of Latin
America. It is simultaneously being confronted in Europe, Asia and
Africa, each state facing unique risks and constraints. Wrestling with
issues of impunity can be the most dangerous and most defining task for
a transitional regime. Vengeance against those who still hold substantial
power can imperil a fledgling democracy. Willful amnesia, on the other
hand, stymies the development of civic virtues indispensable to democ-
racy and perpetuates the culture of corruption and privilege that facilitat-
ed the past violations.
Recognizing that "the dilemma seems insoluble, 2 Impunity and
Human Rights in International Law and Practice nevertheless provides
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Diploma in Law, Oxford
University (1980); J.D., Harvard Law School (1975); B.A., Rice University (1972).
1. See, e.g., Diane Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and
Victim Compensation, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 425, 428-59
(Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994) (detailed discussion of relevant legal
norms).
2. 'IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 300 (Naomi
Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY]. All citations simply to IMPUNITY will refer to
those chapters of the book written by Prof. Roht-Arriaza. Chapters written by other contribu-
tors will be cited using the contributors' names.
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a thoughtful if inconclusive framework for approaching transitional jus-
tice. The book's general chapters, authored by Roht-Arriaza, draw upon
both penological theory and international legal doctrine. The major
portion of the book, however, is devoted to detailed case studies illus-
trating the successes and failures of recent transitional regimes. Roht-
Arriaza's admirable effort to define a consistent legal framework for
optimizing justice during democratic transitions is partially undermined
by her co-authors' dissection of the practice of transitional regimes. The
stories are of pragmatism and compromise, some even of dismal failure.
Few ironclad rules can ultimately be deduced.
While the concept of "impunity" generally suggests exemption from
criminal punishment, this study examines five forms of potential redress.
In addition to prosecution, these include investigation (including truth
commissions), purges, commemoration and compensation. The least
traditional remedy - institutionalized "truth-telling" - receives much
attention due to its rather dubious prominence in recent transitions.
The central policy prescription offered by Roht-Arriaza is that,
whatever form it takes, redress must be "victim-centered. 3 She finds
unhelpful the traditional utilitarian and retributivist models of punish-
ment, favoring either a "denunciation" model, stressing "symbolic and
norm-creating qualities of punishment for the larger society," or "goal-
oriented retributivism" whose focus is upon the victim.4 Roht-Arriaza
notes that a victim-centered view of punishment blurs the distinction
between criminal and civil redress, a distinction not clearly made in all
legal systems 5 and eroding even in Anglo-American practice, where
recent trends favor victim impact statements and court-ordered restitu-
6tion.
Drawing upon psychological studies, Roht-Arriaza describes the
isolation and powerlessness felt by victims of state-sponsored terror,
especially those whose victimization was random.7 Creating a sense of
control and providing systematic explanations may help heal this psy-
chological trauma. Victims deserve to "tell their story fully before a
decision maker who is perceived as neutral, honest, and attentive."' Jos6
3. Id. at 18-22.
4. Id. at 16-17.
5. For example, French practice permits crime victims to institute an action publique, in
essence serving as a private prosecutor. Id. at 18.
6. Id. at 18-19.
7. Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 21.
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Zalaquett 9 and Thomas Buergenthal ° have written movingly of the
experience, as truth commission members, of taking the testimony of
traumatized but dignified survivors. A "victim-centered" approach may
place more emphasis upon official monuments to the victims than on
criminal or civil sanctions on the victimizers.'
Whether international law imposes a mandatory duty to punish gross
human rights violations remains a difficult question. Roht-Arriaza and
Diane Orentlicher 12 have been leading proponents of the view that
international law mandates accountability for gross human rights viola-
tions and crimes against humanity. After the thorough canvassing of
state practice in this volume, however, it seems that the obligation to
investigate and compensate can be stated only at a very high level of
generality. As Roht-Arriaza vaguely notes:
This [statement of the illegality of the Uruguayan amnesty]
does not mean that a society may never, under any circumstances,
choose not to investigate or prosecute. But such choices are con-
strained, both by international obligations of the state itself and by
the rights of individual victims.'
3
Absolute obligations to cease gross violations, and to provide necessary
remedies to free victims from on-going violations, certainly exist, but
obligations to prosecute or to provide specific reparations after the
repression has ceased are more difficult to locate.
9. Jos6 Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma
of. New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1425,
1437 (1992):
The families had refused to allow the previous government authorities to see them
cry as they searched for their loved ones. But now they were being received with
respect and offered a seat and a cup of coffee. The Chilean flag was on the desk as
befits an official commission. They often broke down, because now they could
allow themselves that measure of relief...
The relatives of the victims showed great generosity .... Most of them
stressed that in the end, what really mattered to them was that the truth be re-
vealed, that the memory of their loved ones not be denigrated or forgotten, and that
such things never happen again.
10. Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 539-41 (1994).
11. For example, Kathleen Smith provides an interesting description of the work of
Russia's All-Union Historical-Enlightenment Society "Memorial" and notes the importance of
capturing control over the writing of history in the transition away from communism.
Kathleen E. Smith, Destalinization in the Former Soviet Union, in IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at
113, 118-23.
12. See supra note 1.
13. IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 150 (discussing the failed referendum to repeal the
Uruguayan amnesty law).
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A growing number of human rights treaties do adopt the principle
aut dedere aut judicare.4 The Committee Against Torture stated in
dictum that Argentina's "due obedience" and "punto final" laws
breached the spirit and the purpose of the Convention Against Torture.1
5
In 1992, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ruled that
amnesty laws immunizing military offenders in El Salvador, Uruguay
and Argentina violated the American Convention on Human Rights.'
6
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination found the
Netherlands in breach of its obligation to punish advocacy of hatred due
to its failure to prosecute acts of violence that drove an immigrant
family from public housing. 7 The landmark Velasquez Rodriguez opin-
ion by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights identified an affirma-
tive obligation to "carry out a serious investigation of violations com-
mitted within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, impose the
appropriate punishment and ensure the victim adequate compensation."'"
Yet, human rights treaties also acknowledge the place of clemency
in the criminal justice system.' 9 Roht-Arriaza draws a valid distinction
between individual grants of clemency or pardon, following a finding of
guilt, and blanket amnesties that extinguish the offense entirely.2' The
1992 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearances" supports this distinction, forbidding amnesties but not par-
dons, where the latter do not denigrate the seriousness of the violation.
"Amnesty," meaning the release of political prisoners held by a
dictatorial regime, is an indispensable prerequisite for transition to
14. For example, Article 7 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment requires states in whose territory an alleged torturer is
found'either to extradite himor submit his case to its own authorities. G.A. Res. 46, U.N.
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 198, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 (1984).
15. Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44, at
annex VI, U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990).
16. Report No. 26/92 (El Salvador), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 83, OEA/ser.lV/II.83 (1992);
Report No. 29/92 (Uruguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, OEA/ser.L/II.83, doc. 25 (1992); Report
No. 28/92 (Argentina), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, OEA/ser.LII.83, doc. 24 (1992).
17. Communication No. 4/1991, LK. v. The Netherlands, U.N. GAOR Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 48th Sess., Annex IV, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993).
18. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at para. 174
(Judgment of July 29), reprinted in 1988 INTER-AM. Y.B. ON H.R. 914, 986.
19. E.g., article 6(4) ("[almnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may
be granted in all cases") of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
20. IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 22.
21. G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133
(1993).
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democracy.' Such amnesties possess a powerful symbolic and emotive
value,23 conveying a sense of hope for the future and the triumph of
democratic values over the old despotism.
As noted in Kathleen Smith's study of destalinization in the former
Soviet Union,24 the release of political prisoners is the sine qua non of
liberalization. Yet, magnanimous gestures of forgiveness, if extended to
the agents of state repression, perpetuate the culture of impunity. Such
"bargain[s] with the devil"' 5 are frequent, and this study can offer no
conclusive answers as to when they are justified.
Roht-Arriaza suggests that plea bargaining may serve as a useful
tool in the truth-finding process and that prosecutorial discretion may be
legitimate where it is sufficiently transparent.26 She acknowledges that
even in the Velasquez Rodriguez case the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights refused to order the state to prosecute, limiting itself to
an award of damages from the state to the survivors of the disap-
peared.27 If human rights law does not mandate criminal prosecution of
all offenses, then punishment must be weighed against other legitimate
objectives. Striking the proper balance is morally and politically diffi-
cult, and even clear-minded thinkers like Roht-Arriaza cannot provide an
unwavering compass for transitional regimes.
The European case studies in particular illustrate the dangers of
relying upon selective prosecution to redress criminal acts of prior
regimes and the due process pitfalls of resorting to lesser remedies such
as deprivation of office or pensions. Roht-Arriaza briefly surveys the
post-World War II accounting, including the "ineffectual and easily
corrupted"28 West German boards charged with purging those accused of
complicity in Nazi policies. With respect to French action against Vichy
collaborators, she concludes that punishing thought as well as acts
creates a counterproductive sense of victimization in those sanctioned,
22. Hence, the name Amnesty International signifies the imperative to cease on-going
violations of the rights of prisoners of conscience.
23. For example, the concluding scenes of Ludwig van Beethoven's opera FIDELIO
movingly depict the release of political prisoners by government minister Don Fernando,
seeking to redress persecution by the repressive prison governor. The story of FIDELIO was
strongly influenced by the historic liberation of the Bastille in 1789.
24. Smith, supra note 11, at 115-18. Describing how seven to eight million political
prisoners were eventually released after review by three-person commissions, Smith observes
"[t]he time and form involved in the reversal of a sentence often paralleled the manner of its
imposition - ten minutes in front of a commission with extralegal powers." Id. at 115.
25. IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 300.
26. Id. at 287, 301.
27. Id. at 32.
28. Id. at 74-75.
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and that redress is especially difficult where large portions of the popu-
lation share some degree of complicity.29
More recent experiences in Western Europe illustrate how unique
factors shape the form of redress. In Greece, for example, a tradition of
civilian control over the military, the existence of a functioning civil
court system, the weakening of the military as a result of the failed
Cyprus adventure, and the ability to isolate a small core of renegade
officers all contributed to a relatively successful experience of transition-
al justice following the restoration of democracy in 1974.30 In contrast,
no serious effort was made to confront the past in Spain, where the most
egregious abuses had occurred decades before in the context of a hard-
fought civil war and where the transition to democracy was negotiated
by a king who symbolized "reconciliation and moderation.",3'
Kathleen Smith's 32 profile of Czechoslovakia's "velvet revolution"
emphasizes how the pervasive influence of the Communist Party in the
prior life of the nation created special difficulties for the transitional
regime:
[J]ust as it is problematic to identify who is responsible for the
many "evils of communism," it is equally difficult to decide who
should be considered a victim .. .
The fact that many injustices committed under communism were techni-
cally lawful (in contrast to the gross violations of physical integrity
committed by officials of the Latin American autocracies) shifted atten-
tion to non-penal sanctions such as purges of bureaucrats and loss of
pensions.
Transitional Czechoslovakia enjoyed many advantages in having a
well-known cadre of dissidents, many connected with the Charter 77
movement, possessing recognized moral authority and capable of assum-
ing power free of taint. Even so, playwright Viclav Havel, elected
president of newly democratic Czechoslovakia, discovered that his early
hope for a clean break with the past 34 was impossible to realize. The
"lustration" 35 of former secret police operatives was particularly "partial
29. Id. at 76-77.
30. Id. at 78-80.
31. Id. at 80.
32. Kathleen E. Smith, Decommunization after the "Velvet Revolutions" in East Central
Europe, in IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 82-98.
33. Id. at 87.
34. Id. at 88.
35. Id. at 91.
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and painful. 36 Providing adequate due process during the vetting proce-
dure and the "remedy" of depriving those in complicity with the old
regime of the right to participate in political -life have proven especially
vexing, leading to a wearying and socially disruptive prolongation of the
purge. In Poland, a serious misstep was taken in June 1992 when secret
police files were examined in order to determine whether parliamentary
deputies had been compromised by prior association with the security
forces, and no distinction was drawn in the ensuing disclosure between
those who were "objects of surveillance" and those who had been
agents. 37 "Lustration" in Czechoslovakia was sometimes taken to absurd
lengths, extending even to school cooks.38
The relatively mild penalty of purging bureaucrats carries risks, as
the economic fragility of new democracies creates strong incentives to
avoid transferring management tasks to "incompetent amateurs. 39
Cleansing the judiciary likewise poses a serious challenge, not only in
Europe but in Latin America and Africa as well, as the sacrifice of
experienced specialists may be too costly, or not sufficiently justified by
the degree of their complicity in past injustice. As Owen Fiss observes,'
the task is to optimize, not to maximize, the independence of the judi-
ciary, so that judicial independence promotes the protection of funda-
mental rights without creating a dangerous, undemocratic power center.
This delicate task is neither easily nor quickly accomplished, especially
in states lacking a democratic tradition.
Where transitions are incomplete, as during the periods of liberaliza-
tion in the former Soviet Union and in the Romanian "revolution" of
December 1989, measures of redress may be not only inadequate but
perverse. For example, Nikita Khrushchev falsely portrayed the Commu-
nist Party itself as Stalin's greatest victim.4' The National Salvation
Front which assumed power in Romania was dominated by
apparatchniks of the old regime whose primary act of "redress" was the
summary trial and execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceaucescu, 42 itself a
serious breach of human rights. While other officials of the Ceaucescu
36. Id.
37. Id. at 96.
38. Id. at 98.
39. Id. at 90.
40. Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
41. Smith, supra note 11, at 122.
42. Edwin Rekosh, Romania: A Persistent Culture of Impunity, in IMPUNITY, supra note
2, at 129, 130-32.
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regime were later tried, the pattern was one of "[t]rumped-up charges" 43
of genocide or fiscal crimes followed by "releases on contrived
grounds,"'  a pattern that deepened the despair and cynicism of the
Romanian populace. In response to demonstrations by supporters of the
"Timosoara Proclamation," 45 calling for a purge and temporary ban from
office of former communist activists and secret police agents, the Na-
tional Salvation Front invoked the "Mineriad." This event typifies the
"persistent culture of impunity ''47 in Romania, as the new regime un-
leashed street violence by miners to disperse demonstrators. The vio-
lence extended, without investigation or punishment, to neighborhoods
in Bucharest populated by the disfavored Roma minority.4
Argentina, Chile and El Salvador merit substantial attention in a
work such as this,49 and the case studies devoted to them address key
issues. These include: (1) the tendency to focus upon truth-telling as the
primary form of transitional reckoning; (2) the legality of amnesty laws,
especially as applied to persons guilty of gross violations of physical
integrity; (3) whether impunity is justifiable in order to preserve a
fledgling democracy and how to assess this risk; and (4) the proper
division of authority between national institutions and the international
community in facilitating democratic transitions.
While truth commissions have operated for several decades, the
publicity accorded the publication in 1993 of the report of the United
Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador pushed the truth
commission concept to the forefront in analyses of transitional justice.50
The sudden enthusiasm for truth commissions is puzzling, given that
exposing gross human rights violations has been the stock in trade of
international human rights organizations and the international press for
some decades. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights and
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights employ a panoply of
43. Id. at 132.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 141.
46. Id. at 142.
47. Id. at 144.
48. Id. at 142.
49. While Irwin Stotzky makes some interesting observations concerning obstacles to
democratization in a political culture marked by patron-client relations and "an oscillation
between rule formalism and personal favoritism," his chapter on Haiti is severely handicapped
by its having gone to press in the midst of the surprising chain of events in late 1994. Irwin
P. Stotzky, Haiti: Searching for Alternatives, in IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 185-97.
50. For description and analysis of the most significant exercises in formal truth-telling,
see Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,
16 HUM. RTs. Q. 597, 598 (1994).
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fact-finding devices premised on the idea that exposure of government
wrongdoing deters repressive conduct. The U.N.'s burgeoning collection
of "theme" mechanisms, such as the Working Group on Enforced and
Involuntary Disappearances, have for over a decade sought the truth
concerning the fate of those feared to be victims in order to provide
closure and solace for family members.
What functions do truth commissions perform that distinguish them
from a "rapporteur ' 51 or Amnesty International? In post-repressive
societies, "the victimized populations are often clear about what abuses
took place and who has carried them out. '52 Repressive regimes typical-
ly walk a tightrope between the secrecy needed for plausible deniability
and the visibility necessary to maintain a hold on power through terror.
Juan Mdndez suggests that when hard facts about what was suspected or
feared become part of the "public cognitive scene," they acquire a
"mysterious quality" that "begins to heal the wounds. 53 It is not the
truth, but official acknowledgment of the truth, that is perceived as the
unique contribution of truth commissions.54
Truth commissions are in many respects troubling innovations,
however. The most wrenching issue they pose is whether, in providing
"nothing but the truth," they offer an adequate substitute for punishment
of the perpetrators. The motto of the Aylwin government during the
Chilean transition was "truth, and justice to the extent possible."55 The
report of Chile's Commission on Truth and Reconciliation identified
2,025 cases of fatal human rights violations committed by state agents,
but named no perpetrators, failed to clarify the fate of most of the
victims, and provided the courts only selected information it designated
"new, useful and relevant to judicial investigations."56 A 1978 self-
amnesty by the military remains a vexing legal obstacle to prosecution
for the crimes examined by the Commission.
51. For example, a report titled "The Events Speak for Themselves," authored by
Honduran Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights Leo Valladares, drew primarily
from press, court, and NGO and IGO reports, and identified 179 cases of disappearances.
Valladares' approach was influenced by his prior experience as a member of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 154-55.
52. Hayner, supra note 50, at 607.
53. Id. (quoting Juan Mndez, Review of A Miracle, A Universe, by Lawrence Wechsler,
8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 577, 583 (1991)).
54. IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 283.
55. Jorge Mera, Chile: Truth and Justice under the Democratic Government, in IMPUNI-
TY, supra note 2, at 171, 183.
56. Id. at 172-73, 178.
57. Id. at 179-83.
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In Argentina," a profound division of opinion about the past impeded
transitional justice. President Radll Alfonsfn established the National
Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP) which, despite lacking
the power to compel testimony, issued the ground-breaking report Nunca
Mds investigating over 10,000 cases of disappearances. 59 Alfonsfn also
obtained judicial invalidation of a military self-amnesty and placed junta
leaders on trial. The trials, unfortunately, were initially left within the
jurisdiction of the military courts, the idea being "to allow the military to
cleanse itself."6 Unlike the situation in Greece where the rogue elements
in the military could be excised, the Argentine military continued to
assert that the dirty war had been fully justifiable. As the prosecutions
dragged on, an increasingly weary public witnessed a demoralizing series
of military rebellions, the puntofinal law imposing a sixty-day time limit
on victims' complaints, the "due obedience" law that effectively amnes-
tied intermediate ranks, and eventual pardons of the few convicted.6' In
the end, the process of transitional justice in Argentina only aggravated
the deep flaws in its political culture.
62
Another difficulty with truth commissions is the poor definition of
their scope of inquiry. The Chilean commission, for example, chose to
examine only cases of fatal abuse, ignoring the systematic torture em-
blematic of the Pinochet regime.63 Unable to reach agreement during
U.N.-brokered negotiations, the warring sides in El Salvador delegated to
the Truth Commission the task of selecting the most "important" acts of
violence to investigate.' The Truth Commission used a variety of criteria
- notoriety, severity, accessibility of information, and impact upon
Salvadoran society. 65
Truth commissions generally operate under severe time restrictions,
compounded by lack of official cooperation in producing vital informa-
tion. Commentators agree that rapid completion of the work of truth-
finding greatly enhances its impact.' Roht-Arriaza suggests an outer limit
58. Jaime Malamud-Goti, Punishing Human Rights Abuses in Fledgling Democracies: The
Case of Argentina, in IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 160-70.
59. Id. at 161.
60. Id. at 161-62.
61. Id. at 162.
62. Id. at 165-68.
63. Mera, supra note 55, at 172.
64. Margaret Popkin, El Salvador: A Negotiated End to Impunity?, in IMPUNITY, supra
note 2, at 198, 205-06.
65. Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 500, 505-06.
66. IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 282; Hayner, supra note 50, at 640-41, 652-53.
Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 438, emphasizes that prosecutions must also be prompt, as
experience in states such as Argentina has revealed that "prosecutions of indefinite duration and
scope are likely to destabilize."
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of a year, "before the new government loses the widespread legitimacy
it enjoys, before the political unity engendered by opposition to the old
regime evaporates and apathy sets in, before the old guard can reorganize,
and before the new government is overwhelmed by intractable economic
and social problems."67 Truth commissions are thus necessarily selective
in the stories they report. Unfortunately, as a result their reports never
record the "whole truth," leaving the stories of many victims untold.
Exactly whose acts are a proper subject of inquiry is highly contested.
The Salvadoran Truth Commission was directed to record the depre-
dations of the FMLN as well as those of security forces and death
squads.6' Given the fact that the Salvadoran transition took the form of
a peace agreement to settle a civil war in which humanitarian law
constrained the behavior of the insurgents as well as state forces, this is
understandable. When the Truth Commission found that only 5% of the
"important" incidents reliably reported to it were linked to the FMLN,
right-wing elements predictably accused it of political bias.69 The Truth
Commission also faced criticism for reticence in identifying the civilian
financial backers of the death squads° and for failing to link any inci-
dents directly to U.S. agents.7'
The Chilean commission likewise extended the scope of its inquiries
beyond human rights violations attributable to state actors. Jorge Mera
harshly criticizes the "political considerations ''72 that led to this unwise
concept of impartiality. The effect was to mask the reality of "state
terrorism" during the Pinochet regime, creating the impression that what
had transpired was "merely a skirmish between rival criminal gangs. 73
A similar false moral equivalence, prompted by political motivations,
infected the failed efforts of the Philippine Commission on Human
Rights.74
While official truth commissions are thus better limited to exposing
violations of human rights by state actors, the efforts by the African
National Congress to document the excesses of its agents in refugee
67. IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 282.
68. Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 504, 526-32.
69. Popkin, supra note 64, at 206.
70. Id. at 211.
71. Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 532, explains that "the Commission did not find
sufficient credible evidence - there were of course many rumors and allegations that were
investigated - tying U.S. military or intelligence officers to any specific act of violence. If we
had had that evidence, we would have made it public in the Report."
72. Mera, supra note 55, at 175.
73. Id.
74. Belinda A. Aquino, The Human Rights Debacle in the Philippines, in IMPUNITY, supra
note 2, at 231, 233-34.
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camps in Zambia, Angola, Tanzania and Uganda. are intriguing.75 Though
partly motivated by a desire to stymie the de Klerk government's pro-
posed amnesty for state security forces76 and procedurally flawed,77 the
ANC reports served as a prelude for a governmental Commission of
Truth and Reconciliation established by the Mandela government.78 This
Commission may recommend amnesty or indemnity for members of the
security forces or political movements involved in political crimes, on
condition of their disclosure of the details of their crime and its motiva-
tion.79 In essence a "massive plea-bargaining arrangement,"' this truth
commission may prove to be more effective than its predecessors in Chile
and Argentina. While South Africa has been cited as an example of a
transitional state where trade-offs between justice and democracy would
be most acute,8' recent developments there are relatively encouraging.
One of the most disturbing aspects of these case studies on transi-
tional justice is the extent to which redress is denied out of fear or
prediction of damage to a fledgling democracy. As Jorge Mera notes, the
extent of truth and justice that is "possible" can only accurately be
assessed after redress is attempted; it is forever unknowable where the
transitional government makes an "ex ante prejudgment" that measures
of redress will be dangerous or counterproductive.8 2
The responsibility of the international community for transitional
justice also remains problematic. Cogent reasons existed to draw the
membership of the United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador
from outside Salvadoran society, given the U.N.'s role in brokering the
settlement and the polarization in El Salvador. Harsh reaction greeted the
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission's three Salvadoran mem-
bers to cashier certain guilty officers.8 3
75. See Lynn Berat, South Africa: Negotiating Change?, in IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at
267, 274-75.
76. Id. at 272-74.
77. Richard Carver of Amnesty International described the procedures of the second ANC
inquiry as "weird and ill-thought-out." Hayner, supra note 50, at 633.
78. Berat, supra note 75, at 278.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 279.
81. Zalaquett, supra note 9, at 1429.
82. Mera, supra note 55, at 183-84.
83. While the Truth Commission's members were non-Salvadoran, the Ad Hoc Committee
was made up of prominent Salvadorans because "the military would not accept such a
procedure if it were carried out by foreigners." Popkin, supra note 64, at 203. The Ad Hoc
Committee's delicate task was to identify those members of the military whose human rights
violations justified their removal from office. Its recommendations were honored only under
tremendous pressure from the U.N. and provoked threats of harm to its members. Id. at 203-04.
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The verdict is still out on the question whether direct involvement by
international organizations tends to enhance or to dilute transitional
justice. Michael Vickery trenchantly describes how international politics
and the peace-making role of the United Nations blocked retribution
against the Khmer Rouge and actually gave it renewed influence despite
unredressed crimes of staggering magnitude?' The International Tribunal
to try war crimes committed in ex-Yugoslavia has yet to prove that its
existence stems from a genuine impulse to overcome the impunity
prevailing in the genocidal Bosnian war, rather than from cynical calcu-
lations of the optimal means to force a political settlement on the Bosnian
Serbs.85 The failed 1993 Governor's Island Accord and recent policy by
the United States, intervening under U.N. auspices, attempted to discour-
age President Aristide from taking vigorous action to neutralize the
Haitian military.86 The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador
refrained from advising criminal prosecution of the culprits named in its
report, out of a deep skepticism concerning the Salvadoran judiciary's
competence and integrity.81
It is rare for a transitional government to attempt mass prosecutions
of those guilty of inhuman acts during a preceding period of repression.
Where such an attempt is made, the international human rights commu-
nity may discourage prosecutions out of concern for the due process
rights of the accused and the corrosive effect of unfair trials on the
transitional regime. For example, the long-delayed efforts by the Special
Prosecutor's Office in Ethiopia to try thousands of participants in the
"Red Terror" have been closely monitored by groups such as Human
Rights Watch.8
While Roht-Arriaza and her co-authors approach their subject with
moral passion, there is surprisingly little reflection on the nature of
84. Michael Vickery & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Human Rights in Cambodia, in IMPUNITY,
supra note 2, at 243-51.
85. See IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 303-04. One intriguing innovation adopted by the
International Tribunal (IT) is a process for public indictment of war criminals as to whom
reliable evidence of guilt exists but whose presence at trial is unlikely to be secured. Id. at
301-02. Rule 61 of the IT's Rules of Procedure adds a new wrinkle to the debate, previously
focused on truth commissions, over naming names. Mera, supra note 55, at 177-78; Popkin,
supra note 64, at 207-08.
86. See Stotzky, supra note 49, at 188-91; IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 299; Larry Rohter,
Carter Offers to Mediate for Haitians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995, at A2 ("Since his return to
power on Oct. 15, Mr. Aristide has repeatedly deflected suggestions from the Americans that
he retain some sort of army, if only one limited in size and duties, and has instead largely
dismantled the Haitian armed forces.").
87. Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 535-37.
88. IMPUNITY, supra note 2, at 224-25.
Spring 1995]
Michigan Journal of International Law
human evil and the optimal means to suppress it.89 Perhaps the emphasis
upon "victim-centered" redress unduly shifts attention away from the
perpetrators. As Irwin Stotzky points out, those committing crimes against
humanity follow a moral compass that is incomprehensible to others,
destroying "any possibility of grounding public moral responsibility in
consensus because even moral disagreement is foreclosed by conceptual
divergence." 9 The failures of the transitional states profiled in Impunity
and Human Rights in International Law and Practice thus may be trace-
able to more deep-seated problems than incompetence, indifference or
excess pragmatism. Though this volume contains many useful insights
gleaned from hard experience, international legal doctrine and institutions
remain puny challengers to evil on a mass scale.
89. Irwin Stotzky does include a brief discussion of Immanuel Kant's concept of "radical
evil" which cannot be understood by normal processes of moral assessment, and of Hannah
Arendt's suggestion that "men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish and they are
unable to punish what has turned out to be unforgivable." Stotzky, supra note 49, at 195-96.
90. Id. at 196.,
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